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  Harvey collected his Distinguished Intelligence Medal from the hand of Allen W. Dulles and took over as chief of Division D, succeeding Frank Rowlett. Harvey’s very confidential appointment was a sign that he was highly regarded and trusted on the quarterdeck of the CIA, despite General Truscott’s misgivings of years earlier, despite the clashes with political and psychological (PP) officers, despite his reputation for flamboyance and boozing.

  Formerly Staff D, Division D ranked with Jim Angleton’s Counterintelligence/Counterespionage Staff as the most secretive of the Agency’s Clandestine Services. In my day, for instance, one required special clearance and documentation to enter Angleton’s suite of offices; lacking that, you shoved your piece of paper through a slot in a forbidding door and retreated as if pursued by howling banshees. Staff D was simply off-limits and rarely mentioned—not even in the sardonic jokes that rippled along the temps’ fusty corridors.

  Throughout 1960 Harvey stayed deeply dug into Division D, conducting its obscure business without leaving any accessible paper trail. On the political warfare–executive action side of the Clandestine Services, though, things were far from routine, even for the CIA. Political, Psychological, and Paramilitary Warfare (PP/PM) erupted in April 1961 at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, a failure that shortly brought East and West to nuclear confrontation.

  The upper reaches of the CIA were in a metaphorical sweat. Richard Bissell, a knight of Camelot, the man who ramrodded the U-2 project and who bore the responsibility for the Bay of Pigs, was soon on his way out. Toward the end of November 1961, Bissell called Harvey in and gave him the most secret assignment in the Agency’s quiver.

  Simultaneously, a broken and rapidly aging Allen W. Dulles resigned as director of central intelligence (DCI), effective November 28. John F. Kennedy selected a surprised businessman, John McCone, as the new DCI.

  With the reputation Harvey had so carefully cultivated, it’s no wonder Richard Bissell chose Bill to do some heavy lifting.

  THE BAY OF PIGS

  Many books have been written about the Bay of Pigs operation, and even though it now is medieval history, it’s still one of the most searing miscalculations in all U.S. foreign policy history. Suffice it here to quote Dr. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the eminent Harvard historian and one of JFK’s inner circle, reflecting aloud at a Bay of Pigs conference held in Havana, Cuba, in March 2001: “In the long annals of U.S. foreign policy, no fiasco was more complete, no miscarriage more total, than the Central Intelligence Agency’s attempted invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Historians call it, ‘the perfect failure.’’’2

  Tension had long been simmering between Bissell and Dick Helms. Many foreign intelligence (FI) officers had simply refused to take part in the Bay of Pigs operation. It was, said Jim Critchfield years later, as if the two branches of the Clandestine Services, FI and PP/PM, were living in two different worlds. “Just a few days before [the invasion], Helms invited Jim Angleton, Lloyd George, Tom Karamessenes, and me [his top staff] into his office and said that Bissell had just called him in and apologized for not staying in close touch and told Dick the Cuban operation was about to kick off.”3

  “Helms didn’t give Tracy [Barnes of PP] the best people,” said Al Ulmer, who had been moved from the Far East to a European station. “But Tracy wouldn’t have known them anyway.”4 All of the CIA took the rap for the Bay of Pigs fiasco. It was the worst, most flagrant, most costly of many disasters that the PP side of the Clandestine Services sponsored during the Cold War.

  CRITCHFIELD’S ACCOUNT

  It’s worthwhile pausing to glance at the internal working of the CIA from the point of view of Jim Critchfield, the gallant former U.S. Army tank commander/colonel who was for many years chief of Pullach Operations Base, the CIA liaison element to the Gehlen Organization, which in 1955 became the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND, Federal Intelligence Service).

  Critchfield was from North Dakota, a quiet operator who let his deeds speak for themselves. Harvey’s bluster and theatrics were intended to achieve the same end. The two barons respected each other, though they were worlds apart. Bill had a sardonic nickname for almost everyone, but I cannot recall that he ever called Critchfield by anything other than his real name. Jim lacked any idiosyncrasy that Bill could have latched onto.

  Critchfield was also one of the few senior FI officers who got on with Bissell. Before becoming head of the Near East Division (NE) and after his service in Pullach, Germany, he had recommended military backup for any CIA amphibious operations based on his experiences in the Sicilian invasion. In March 1960, as head of NE, Jim attended a high-level conference in Athens. While in Athens, he and Bissell dined at a sidewalk cafe. “He told me that Eisenhower had approved a paramilitary operation against Cuba…. Bissell asked me to assume responsibility for it.” Critchfield refused, politely but firmly. The amphibious operation had no military backup.

  Months later Dulles and McCone met with Attorney General Bobby Kennedy and Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale on Dulles’s last day as DCI, November 28, 1961. In that meeting, Lansdale told Bobby Kennedy that he would like Dulles and McCone to agree that Critchfield be assigned as Agency rep on the new task force Kennedy had created to dispose of Castro. Once again Critchfield dodged the bullet. “I talked with Dulles an hour later and pointed out that I was deep into the NE assignment, which he had created, and thought it wholly in the U.S. interest that I stay with it. At a dinner that same evening, Dulles told me he had stopped by to see Bobby Kennedy at home on the way to dinner and told him that it was his firm recommendation that I not be re-assigned.

  “I must admit that I had no desire to get involved in Bobby Kennedy’s operation to dispose of Castro.

  “That is the full story on my involvement in Cuba. I stayed away from Task Force W. It was a busy time in the Middle East.”5

  A MYSTERIOUS TRIP

  To reiterate, Harvey returned to Washington in late 1959 to take over the cryptological intelligence section of the Clandestine Services, Division D. Given Bill’s feelings about paper trails and the nature of D’s activities, the record of his tenure at the post is sparse and likely always has been. Figuring out exactly what Harvey was up to from October 1959 until November 1961 is almost impossible. There are, however, some indications of his activities.

  A year after he took over Division D, but well before he became the official head of ZRRIFLE, the Agency’s assassination program, Harvey took a trip to Europe, probably to vet, although not (yet) recruit, European criminal lowlife who might be useful in Division D’s clandestine procurement operations. At least that’s what the trip appeared to be.

  I have come across only one document that even by implication puts Harvey into direct contact with criminals, apart from Johnny Rosselli, whom we will meet later: a heavily censored CIA internal dispatch from a station abroad to Washington, written October 13, 1960. The geographical names and pseudonyms that appear in the dispatch have been redacted. Originally graded top secret—a surprising classification for what otherwise looks to be a routine dispatch—it is addressed to Division D, Attn: [ ]. from Chief [ ]. Subject: Envelope For [ ].

  “Forwarded herewith is an envelope of [ ] notes based on his discussions in the [ ] Station. Please hold for his return.” The signature is blanked.

  The notes are a page of typed, terse comments, which might be spotting notes, presumably dictated by Harvey to a secretary. The focus of the notes is the Trieste region of northern Italy, but there are subtle hints that Harvey had been elsewhere on the trip.

  Source: [ ] 11 & 12 Oct 60:

  [ ] Interpol Rep as source and spotter for Corsicans.

  [ ] to pick his brain and pinpoint his ability to do this job for us, but once selection made, [ ] to be eliminated. [ ] believes KUBARK [CIA] handling as matter of convenience in behalf of Narcotics Bureau [Department of Treasury predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Administration] [ ] to follow up with [ ] on word from Hqs. Purpose is selection of one or two Corsicans as en
try men to be teamed with Triestino safecracker.

  [ ] Chief of Detective [sic] [ ]. Thoroughly acquainted Trieste picture. Appears to have on tap safecracker, lockpicker type, ca. 40 years old, whom he had once mentioned to Rowlon [pseudonym for an unknown CIA case officer].

  [ ] outside man in Trieste, to follow up with [ ] after briefing by [ ] and [ ]. Purpose is selct [sic] Triestino for teaming with Corsicans, split them after job done. Possible find Triestino speaking German as well as Italian. Possible German documentation.

  (1) Siragusa, Asst Deputy Narcotics Commissioner, as source on Corsicans and Sicilians; query him whether District #2 [New York, New Jersey, New England] has West Indian colored contacts suitable for our purposes.

  (2) [ ] contact: [ ], Rome, American citizen, has clearance, good potential PA, experienced with criminals; educated England and US.

  (3) [ ] offers good possibilities of finding safecrackers and document-suppliers.

  (4) [ ] contact Florence: bar owner, speaks Italian, German, English, has thorough knowledge underworld Antwerp and Brussels, working knowledge underworld Frankfurt, Cologne, Nice.

  (5) [ ], Chief of Criminal Investigation Branch, [ ] has two expert safecrackers who were introduced to [ ] on 19 July 60 in Barcelona.

  (6) [ ] born 11 May 1910, Antwerp; stateless [or Russian descent]. Alias “[ ],” “[ ].” Knowledgeable northern underworld. Possible spotter. Has worked for CID, [ ] Narcotics Bureau, and RCMP. Speaks English. Can locate through CID Fran, or thru desk clerks at Frankfurter Hof, asking for [ ] and using [ ] name as reference with him.

  For trng purposes: French commercial film Rififi can be obtained through [ ] Interpol; excellent detail on planning and execution of safecracking job.6

  We’ll come back to this curious matter later.

  A BRITISH VIEW

  As he took hold of Staff D, Harvey needed help wherever he could get it, although he would have been loath to admit it.

  In October 1961, two years after Harvey returned to run Division D, one year after his known spotting trip in Europe, and a year before the Cuban Missile Crisis, the National Security Agency (NSA) called a conference on code breaking to which the British were invited. Peter Wright, a former British counterintelligence (MI-5) officer who wrote a vivid tell-all book about his experiences, found, as expected, that he and his colleagues were met at the NSA conference with suspicion—even hostility—by their CIA opposites, particularly by Harvey. Guy Burgess’s cartoon of Libby and Kim Philby’s perfidy had “left [Harvey] with a streak of vindictive anti-British sentiment,” even despite his close cooperation with the Brits on the tunnel and a bond of genuine affection between him and Peter Lunn, the MI-6 station chief in Berlin.

  It was an awkward time. The Brits were intent on working their way back into full partnership, to overcome the blotches on their record caused by the still-hovering Philby-Burgess-McLean mess, which had by this time expanded to “the Cambridge Five.” Wright had the uncomfortable job of briefing the Americans on yet another delicate matter: the case of Gordon Lonsdale, a deep-cover Soviet agent who had gathered Royal Navy secrets. At a briefing, Wright talked about the Lonsdale case, which nearly brought the conservative government down because of his dalliance with a couple of party girls who had very high social and political connections. Harvey let Wright feel the sting of his scorn over what he considered slipshod British security.7

  During his trip to America for the NSA conference, Wright agreed to meet Jim Angleton and Harvey for dinner one night. He was driven out to a rustic site in northern Virginia, where Angleton and the head of the Western Europe Division were already present. Harvey arrived shortly thereafter with a bottle of Jack Daniels. The evening did not start auspiciously. Harvey waxed profane as he accused the Brits in general of trying to get money for their projects from Uncle Sam, while harboring another deep penetration in their midst.

  “Harvey was all puffed out and purple like a turkeycock, sweat pouring off his temples, his jacket open to reveal a polished shoulder holster and pistol, his gross belly heaving with drink. It was now four o’clock in the morning. I had had enough for one night, and left.”

  The following day Angleton apologized, saying Harvey “drinks too much and thinks you have to give a guy a hard time to get the truth. He believes you now.” Angleton said Harvey wanted to meet Wright to discuss Cuba.

  Wright agreed to meet Angleton and Harvey at a Washington restaurant the next day. Harvey arrived looking “well-scrubbed and less bloated than usual, and made no reference to the events of two nights before.” He wanted to hear Wright’s experience as a counterinsurgency officer in Cyprus during the EOKA troubles, the right-wing nationalist Greek effort to throw Britain off the strategic Eastern Mediterranean island in the 1950s. Harvey wanted to see if British experience could be valuable in the American effort to get rid of Castro.

  Bill saw interesting parallels: Cyprus and Cuba were both islands with dominant guerrilla forces headed by forceful, media-savvy leaders. So he asked Wright what the Brits might do in Cuba, if they had to deal with the Castro problem. The man from London was careful to stress that he was not giving official advice, but he speculated that Whitehall would probably do all it could to nurture a native resistance, “‘whatever assets we had down there—alternative political leaders, that kind of thing.’

  “‘We’ve done that,’ said Harvey impatiently, ‘but they’re all in Florida. Since the Bay of Pigs, we’ve lost virtually everything we had inside….’

  “‘How would you handle Castro?’” Angleton asked.

  “‘We’d isolate him, turn the people against him….’

  “‘Would you hit him?’ interrupted Harvey…. I realized why Harvey needed to know I could be trusted.” The meeting was about a month before Bill was officially given the “Kill Castro” assignment. He and Angleton obviously suspected the order was coming down from Bissell. Wright also realized that Harvey’s bravura performance at the Virginia dinner several nights earlier had been, at least in part, a test.

  “‘We’d certainly have that capability,’ I replied, ‘but I doubt we would use it nowadays.’”

  Harvey was most interested in the use of poisons. He said, “We’re developing a new capability in the Company to handle these kinds of problems, … and we’re in the market for the requisite expertise.” Bill was referring obliquely to what became ZRRIFLE. This statement might also be regarded as a veiled offer, should Peter Wright even vaguely want to consider coming over to join the CIA enterprise.

  “Whenever Harvey became serious, his voice dropped to a low monotone, and his vocabulary lapsed into the kind of strangled bureaucratic syntax beloved of Washington officials. He explained needlessly that they needed deniable personnel, and improved technical facilities—in Harvey jargon, ‘delivery mechanisms.’”

  Bill also expressed interest in the British Special Air Service (SAS), the equivalent of the Green Berets. Wright said that SAS could not be hired out, but he indicated some retired SAS personnel might be available to freelance, if Harvey could get clearance for their use from the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6).

  “Harvey looked irritated, as if I were being deliberately unhelpful.” Wright cordially suggested that the French might be useful, unaware that Bill had made at least one spotting trip to Europe a year earlier.

  “‘You’re not holding out on us over this, are you?’ asked Harvey suddenly. The shape of his pistol was visible again under his jacket.” Wright made a feeble joke about being the junior partner in the great transatlantic alliance, but “Harvey was not the kind of man to laugh at a joke. Come to that, neither was Angleton.”

  It is evident from these quotations that Angleton was intimately involved with Harvey, at least in the early stages of ZRRIFLE. And it’s interesting that Wright suggested that the CIA might look for talent in France.

  THE SIMMERING POT

  Much has been made, in a number of books, of Harvey’s role as the CIA’s point man on Cuban ope
rations. He was the man Bissell and the Kennedy brothers turned to to avenge themselves for their loss of face in the Bay of Pigs debacle. The framework of the Cuban Missile Crisis is well-known; the role that Harvey and his close associates played during the period from late 1961 until Harvey’s removal in October 1962 is not.

  During the build-up to the crisis, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the Kennedy’s designated top man on Cuba, was determined that whatever might yet come would not be as horrendously embarrassing as the Bay of Pigs. One aspect was to ensure that the CIA committed itself to paper. General Taylor and others did not make a distinction between the Bissell’s PP operators, who had been responsible for the Bay of Pigs, and the FI mindset, typified by Dick Helms, which took control. To outsiders, then and later, CIA was CIA, period.

  General Taylor told Brigadier General Lansdale to come up with a master plan to wreak havoc, death, and destruction in Cuba. Sam Halpern recalls that Lansdale’s resulting directives became infamous for their grandiosity and their sheer lack of comprehension of Cuban reality. “The first thing was to collect intelligence. We all knew we were writing the book as we went along.”8

  SOMETHING SPECIAL

  Cuba was something special, and the CIA’s Cuban operations were way, way out of the routine. Even despite the reckless Bay of Pigs calamity, the Kennedys urged that normal cautions on matters relating to Cuba be disregarded; this neglect in itself was an insult to Harvey, a man steeped in the clandestine mode who would take risks, sure, but only after he had calculated the odds very finely.

  Bill’s precept had always been that he would not share his activities with others, especially those outside the CIA, except as absolutely necessary. Yet Task Force W, although a creature of the CIA, was directly beholden to Attorney General Bobby Kennedy, the administration’s restless anti-Cuban crusader, and to the heavyweight interagency committee he created, the Special Group Augmented (SGA).