Flawed Patriot Page 20

  On August 13, 1962, Lansdale, showing his poor judgment, committed McNamara’s thoughts to paper in a memorandum to State, Defense, the CIA, and the USIA that outlined the game plan for Cuba. David Martin reported in Wilderness of Mirrors, “There, in black and white, Lansdale wrote: ‘Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (including liquidation of leaders), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary.’”10

  Halpern was by then well used to Harvey’s profane dismissal of those on the policy level who couldn’t leave messy matters to the pros. He fills in the details: “Harvey [read the Lansdale memo mentioning assassination and listened to McCone’s angry protests] with a straight face, then stormed back to his basement office, scratched out the offending words from the memo. He raged against the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in such a document. All mention of the liquidation of leaders had to be expunged from the official minutes of the meeting.”11

  The next, thunderous step was an understated memorandum to Helms, a photocopy of which exists in Harvey’s personal papers.

  MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director

  SUBJECT: Operation MONGOOSE

  1. Action: None. This memorandum is for your information.

  2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were “including liquidation of leaders.”

  3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk’s office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

  4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale’s office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no such document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

  William K. Harvey

  Chief, Task Force W

  The stifled bureaucratic prose of the memo masks Bill’s outright fury that senior government officials—namely subcabinet and cabinet officers—could be so naïve as to mention (and then commit to paper) the U.S. government’s consideration of the liquidation of the head of a foreign state.

  The Agency’s IG reported in 1967, “Harvey told us that Lansdale repeatedly tried to raise the matter of assassination of Castro over the next several weeks. Harvey says that he always avoided such discussions. Harvey estimates that five persons in Lansdale’s office were generally aware of the sensitive details of project Mongoose and of Lansdale’s interest in assassination as an aspect of it.”

  Lansdale later recalled “he had only one brief conversation with the CIA agent after the 10 August meeting. At that time, Harvey stated, ‘he would look into [the assassination of Castro and] see about developing some plans.’ Not surprisingly, Lansdale insisted that was the last he ever heard about assassinations.” On August 30, after another session with Bobby Kennedy, Lansdale was back to talking up revolt against Castro and attacks on Soviet bloc personnel that could be blamed on Castro’s regime.12

  The discomfort of some senior government officials over the matter of Castro’s assassination was real, even though they could not then even begin to guess the ramifications of the CIA’s involvement with the domestic Mafia on ZRRIFLE. What follows is complicated and obscure, but it is an essential part of Harvey’s, and indeed, the nation’s story.

  PLANNING PROJECT ZRRIFLE

  Even though plans for the elimination of Castro were among the U.S. government’s most sensitive secrets, the CIA had to record at least some aspects of the operation.

  The ZRRIFLE project name first appears, as far as is known, in May 1961, six months before Harvey was given the Castro assignment, but while Bill was chief of Division D. The first page of the file is in Harvey’s own scrawl. Dated January 25, 1962, i.e., after he had assumed ZRRIFLE but before he officially took over responsibility for all Cuban operations, the paper contains some Harvey-esque doodles, as if it had been written while Bill was in a meeting. The notes were the precursor to a project outline that formalized ZRRIFLE. Although they are not specific, I assume that the handwritten documents refer to the spotting and possible recruitment of one or more foreign gangsters who could be used to assassinate Fidel Castro. Helms might have strongly urged Harvey to abandon this approach, so he could better concentrate his efforts at finding a liquidator in the domestic underworld.

  The photocopy from which I made the notes below does not cover the margins of the original document. I have included some of the notes for the flavor they give of what was about to be undertaken.

  The text:

  25/1 Exec meeting [possibly a meeting between Helms and Harvey]

  “The Magic Button”

  … for a living—RIS 201 cover [RIS = KGB; 201 = personnel file]

  … utions—Bankruptcy—No Star

  … eyes—Jim A—Contradestruct [Jim A = Angleton]

  … a TSD problem from U-2

  [TSD = Technical Services Division]

  … last resort beyond last resort &

  a confession of weakness—

  El Benefactor—[illegible]

  Elint R & D—Memo [Elint = electronic intelligence]

  basic sound project

  —AS—Fanfani—[Arnold S?—the Luxembourg Second-Story team’s case officer? Amintore Fanfani was an Italian politician and prime minister.]

  never mention word assassination

  1. Select proper officer to run

  2. Place & cover Max 2/3

  3. Security—Rules B—WKH—A[rnold]S (?) -

  4. [illegible] lives Sid—Reserv[ations?]

  5. Last resort—Brakes Substitute what [illegible]

  6. No other agencies.

  7. No project on paper except for cover.

  8. Principal Agent [blacked out] AF Project draft LCH [probably CIA general counsel Lawrence Houston] travel—1500—from “RB”

  9. Disposal [Disposal of an agent at the end of an operation is always a consideration; it is not necessarily hostile.]

  10. Targets who where Must know before we can spot

  11. Case officering

  12. Cover file—Create from RIS [Russian Intelligence Service—KGB] or abt it—non-Sov

  13. Note dangers of RIS counter-action & monitor if they are blamed.

  7d. I list—Remember13

  The gist of Harvey’s notes—but not all of their nuances—was translated into a formal project outline dated February 19, 1962. The formal document referred only to the Earl Harter style of cryptographic procurement, but it is sufficiently flexible to cover the admininstrative needs of the Castro assassination undertaking.

  Project ZRRIFLE

  1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop and use foreign agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third country installations and personnel.

  2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cip
her materials and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

  3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of [words are illegible] as a developmental activity. During the same period, requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects, more sensitive. Because most [overseas] stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the [exploratory] category.

  4. Operational Assets: 1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in [nearly two lines heavily redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half, he was contacted sporadically by Luxembourg, on behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of the Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In October 1960, [page ends abruptly and is not followed by a sequential sentence.]

  The next page in the Harvey papers is the ZRRIFLE budget:

  Pay for agents on completion of jobs?14 [Emphasis added.]

  ZRRIFLE: CRYPTO PROCUREMENT OR POLITICAL ASSASSINATION?

  Next in the file are some grimly fascinating notes specific to political assassination, not to crypto procurement operations. They are not in Harvey’s handwriting; rather, I suspect the writer was Seymour B., of Harvey’s Task Force W staff, or perhaps Justin O’Donnell of Division D.

  I have seen two versions of the same tough, even ruthless, memorandum and have tried to combine them. One was apparently the original working draft; the second was a rewrite. Combining the two conveys the thoughts and apprehensions of Harvey’s closest staff member on a breaking-and-entering cryptographic procurement operation. If the memo is actually about assassination, it’s apparent, as Halpern said, that Bill did not tell his most-trusted lieutenants what he was really engaged in.

  The document was originally stamped, “Reproduction prohibited”; one version is stamped, “Approved for release 28 Aug 1985; the other version is stamped, “Approved for release CIA Historical Review Program 1993.” How the notes came into the possession of CG Harvey remains a mystery.

  1) Legal, ethical-moral, operational problems; political; nonattributability.

  2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (& effect on DDP) and experiences w/ KGB (Crossup, Bandera group, Khokhlov [i.e., KGB assassination operations])—require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable [could also be “sterile,” as in securely compartmented], CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search & w/ guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/ known high regard for operational security, assessment and [illegible].

  3) Maximum security: (highest not secure enough) & within KUBARK [CIA] only (e.g., how much does Siragusa [the senior Bureau of Narcotics official for whose needs QJWIN had originally been recruited] need to know?) Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering and deciphering. Guise of [illegible] objective. No approach to other Govt agencies.

  b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, training, case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

  c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo—word-of-mouth & no bashfulness re trips.

  d. (Every operation to be rigidly case-officered. No silk-shirt PA’s [principle agents]) No PA’s except for search or intermediaries….

  e. No approach to officials of foreign govts. (Non-attributability; no American citizen or American resident for direct action. Possibly for approach to foreign elements.) No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners—and limited official reference. No chain of connection permitting blackmail. Don’t [ ] any [ ] as home territory. Avoid discussion with foreign officials until all possibility of search through [ ] has been examined.

  f. No approach to any agent who ever [worked for] a U.S. Govt agency. Training by opposition would reveal.

  g. Use of already tested assets (e.g. [blanked-out—probably QJWIN]) in the search.

  h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers [CIA staff members] who can pass as foreigners.

  i. Pretext: Kutube/D [FI/D] search; this established (e.g. Rome) [Note: It is interesting that Germany is not listed specifically as a recruiting ground; it could and should have provided a considerable pool of potential break-and-enter crooks, and/or assassins of various, even indeterminate, nationalities. Perhaps for that very reason, and because of the large American presence there, it was excluded as too obvious a source.]

  j. No discussion in [CIA] stations.

  k. No “team” until ready to go, if at all.

  4. Blackmail:

  a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visas.

  b. No chain of knowledgeable [?—sic]. Strictly person-to-person; singleton ops.

  c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

  d. Exclude organized criminals, e.g. Sicilians, criminals, those w/record of arrests, those w/ instability of purpose as criminals.

  e. Staffers involved—selection.

  5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow … organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime. Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

  6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

  7. Former resistance personnel a possibility. Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selection. All Kubark personnel should have some CE experience.

  8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

  9. Should have phony 201 [personnel file] in RI [Central Registry] to backstop this. All documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like a CE file.

  10. Possible use of defectors for these actions.

  11. Silverthorne and stable in [sic—?]

  What are limits on team or individuals selected? No “team” until ready to go.

  Danger of standbys.

  Keeping of files15 [Emphasis added.]

  If we did not now live in such a chilling age, the relentless, ruthless qualifications Harvey was looking for would be startling in themselves. Yes, the project outline can be read to apply only to break-and-enter crypto procurement. But it could also have applied to the recruitment of assassins. At any rate, it was obviously intended to provide absolute maximum security for one or more very nervy operations.

  In light of what comes later, paragraph 4d is particularly interesting: “Exclude organized criminals, e.g. Sicilians, criminals, those w/ record of arrests, those w/ instability of purpose as criminals.” Followed by paragraph 5: “Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow … organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime. Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.” And, finally, paragraph 7: “Former resistance personnel a possibility. Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selection.”

  A significant question arises from the mention, immediately above, of Si
cilians: Why was Harvey concerned that investigation could “lead to the Mafia”? There is the barest hint here of explosive connections among the CIA, the American Mafia, and its Sicilian parent group. We’ll look at the possible connection later.

  Also in the personal file left by Harvey, and later, CG, is a memorandum dated less than a month later that carries no classification stamp but has a handwritten note from Harvey: “Skip, Pls file securely.” This memo was Bill’s license to proceed.

  February 1962

  MEMORANDUM FOR: William K. Harvey

  SUBJECT: Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities

  1. For the purpose of ZRRIFLE activities, you are hereby authorized to retain the services of Principal Agent QJWIN and such other principal agents and sub-agents as may be required. This authorization will continue to be in force through 31 December 1962, subject to renewal at that time.

  2. As established by contract with him, QJWIN’s salary will be $7,200 per annum. Accounting for the expenses of QJWIN and other agents involved in this activity will be in the form of receipts for funds received by them, and these receipts will be retained in the ZRRIFLE covert operational file. Because of the sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category and by your [portion illegible]. In addition to the salary payable to … QJWIN, you are authorized the expenditure of $7,500 through 31 December 1962. If further funds are necessary, they will be provided.