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  Very truly yours,

  John Edgar Hoover.

  A handwritten note on the carbon copy of the letter says, “Please review. Let me have your complete recommendation re disciplinary action and steps to prevent recurrence.”

  Harvey had done the right thing at the right time, but he had sinned against the Buddha’s doctrine. Regardless, six days after the letter of censure, the Bureau began to take a major Soviet espionage agent seriously and Harvey was back in play.

  TAKING ON THE NEW ENEMY

  In 1945 Bill was one of three Bureau agents who formed the FBI’s—indeed, the United States’—first counterespionage effort targeted against Soviet intelligence activities.8 The first major case on which Harvey worked—which is, again, not mentioned in his personnel file and for which he is not credited in Curt Gentry’s J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets—was the matter of Elizabeth Bentley.

  In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley made an appointment with the FBI office in New York. Worried that her cover was blown by the recent defections of two KGB agents to the West, she confessed to the FBI that she was a courier for a KGB espionage network.9 The first defection that caused her concern was that of former Communist Louis Budenz, who went to the New Haven FBI office in August. The defection of Igor Gouzenko, a code clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, seems to have been what finally made her ready to confess.

  FBI men interrogated Bentley, starting on November 7, 1945. She eventually named more than one hundred Soviet agents and contacts. She “had carried secret data to the Russians from U.S. government employees in the OSS, the Air Force, the War Department, the War Production Board, Foreign Economic Administration, and the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce. This was a staggering penetration of the U.S. government by the Soviets. Bentley’s initial confession was of such moment that Hoover sent an immediate digest to the White House on November 8, 1945.”10 He followed up with a comprehensive report to President Truman on November 27. Someone put in a huge amount of overtime.

  A longtime FBI employee states with certainty that “Harvey was head of Division Five—National Security—when Bentley came in. He was the logical person to handle her.” Was it FBI custom that a medium-rank officer whose forte had been desk analysis be assigned to handle a very hot walk-in source? The employee I spoke to indicated that there was nothing out of the ordinary in the assignment at the time.11

  Bentley’s handler was Harvey, and Bentley was Harvey’s first major vest-pocket operation. Clarence Berry says that part of the Harvey legend in the late 1940s was that Bill played the Bentley case so close to the vest only top brass knew about it. Knowledge of the case was, in fact, more widespread than that, but the perception fed the legend.

  I have seen one undated photograph that shows Bentley appearing before a House of Representatives committee flanked by a man who appears to be Bill Harvey. Alger Hiss is also in the photo. The shot was probably taken at a session of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) in 1947, shortly before Harvey resigned from the Bureau. It is the only published photograph of Bill, except for copies of mug shots, that I have ever seen.

  Robert L. Lamphere, a colleague and contemporary of Harvey, comments sourly in his autobiography, “The ‘major case’ squad [i.e., Harvey and his people] that had been cleaning up matters relating to wartime German and Japanese espionage was running out of work and the Bentley case was taken away from the experts in Soviet espionage and given to this other squad. My colleagues were disgusted at this bureaucratic move.”

  By July 1947 Lamphere was in charge of the Gerhard Eisler case, a major Communist prosecution. The trial took place in Washington. “Each day after court, I reported to Bill Harvey who was the headquarters supervisor in charge of the Eisler case…. His voice was like that of a bullfrog; once you heard it … and the intellect behind it … you never forgot it. The resident Bureau expert on counterintelligence, Bill had been so busy handling the Bentley case that I’d been pretty much left alone on Eisler. In our meetings, he’d offer a few suggestions, but little more.”

  Then, a further interesting note from Lamphere: When the Eisler case ended, “Bill Harvey said to me that new blood was needed on the counter-intelligence desks at Headquarters, and asked if I would informally sound out some of the people on the New York Soviet Espionage squad about coming down to Washington. Harvey’s request was an absolute breach of Bureau procedure.”12

  BACK IN GOOD GRACES?

  Harvey continued to rack up creditable efficiency ratings. Edward A. Tamm, a senior FBI official, wrote, “I am impressed with the amount of both intelligent research and file review and logical thinking and conclusions … a manifestation of real supervision.”

  The cause for this encomium was a tight, sixteen-page analysis and operational brief cum order dated December 9, 1945—only a few weeks after Bentley started to talk seriously to the FBI—on possible American connections to the famous Rote Kapelle/Rote Drei Soviet GRU (military intelligence) espionage apparatus going back into prewar and, especially, 1941–42 files. Harvey’s action dispatch to FBI bureaus said, “Every possible investigative technique should be utilized for the purpose of fully and completely developing the significance of this information and the identities…. Of particular importance in this connection is complete coverage of all communications to and from these individuals…. The investigation is considered of the utmost importance.”

  An efficiency report called Bill, four months before his departure from the FBI, “vigorous, forceful and aggressive … definitely outstanding as to intelligence, ability and application…. One of the best supervisors at the Seat of Government.” But shortly after this glowing review, something happened to change Harvey’s career and, indeed, American Cold War history. It was an incident that involved booze. It could be interpreted as a precursor of much else in Bill’s future.

  THE ROCK CREEK PARK INCIDENT

  The official version in Harvey’s FBI personnel file is an internal memorandum dated July 15, 1947, from Edward A. Tamm to the director.

  Just before 10:00 on the morning of July 12, Libby Harvey reported Bill missing in a phone call to Mickey Ladd, head of the FBI’s Domestic Security Division. “She stated that Mr. Harvey had recently been despondent and discouraged about his work at the Bureau and had been moody.”

  On the dark and rainy night of Friday, July 11, 1947, Harvey and a number of other FBI men attended a stag party in Arlington, Virginia, for Harvey’s boss. Harvey imbibed “about two cans of beer.” Robert Lamphere, in his memoir, comments flatly, “Harvey had drunk too much.”

  Bill eventually got into his car and led his immediate boss, Patrick Joseph Coyne, across Memorial Bridge back into the District of Columbia. At some point, Coyne found his bearings and peeled off. Bill took the urban highway through Rock Creek Park, on course for 39th Street, in the northwestern reaches of D.C. But he didn’t show up at home. Libby kept silent for a number of hours before she called Mickey Ladd. We can’t know whether her reticence was a sign there was already coolness in the marriage.

  Ladd was about to order agents to check the Metropolitan Police and hospitals when “we were advised that Mr. Harvey had arrived at his residence.”

  Bill told the office that “he was proceeding towards his residence in a heavy downpour of rain.” His car stalled when he drove through a puddle and was heavily splashed by an oncoming vehicle. “He coasted to the curb, but was unable to get his car started again, and accordingly went to sleep … until approximately 10.00AM, when he awakened and proceeded to his home.” The fix was in: it could not be admitted in official documents, perhaps not even in verbal reports to the director, that Harvey and everyone else at the party had been drunk.

  Tamm stuck his neck out for Harvey. “Record during his assignment at the Seat of Government has been a very good one…. I personally have seen Harvey at his desk late at night on many occasions…. I do not believe in the light of all the circumstances in this case that there is
any administrative action which should be taken.” Harvey was “very much upset about the matter…. [Tamm was] convinced Harvey was telling an accurate story.” Up the chain of command, Mickey Ladd took the soft option, saying, “While we had no question as to his sobriety on this occasion, we were concerned about the possibility of his being completely exhausted from overwork or worry … [we wondered] whether it would be better for him if he were transferred to another assignment, particularly in light of his wife’s statement that he has been despondent and discouraged about his work.

  “Mr. Harvey indicated … that he did periodically become discouraged about the ineffectiveness of the overall Government program in dealing with the Communists and Communist espionage…. [He] prefers his present desk to any assignment…. His worry was the natural worry [of] anyone who dealt as intimately with the Communist problem as he had been doing for several years.”

  For Hoover, Harvey’s sin was that he had been unreachable for a number of hours, should the director have suddenly needed him.

  One week after the incident report, Hoover wrote a letter to Clyde A. Tolson, whom Gentry calls “the director’s inseparable companion.”

  July 23, 47

  PERSONNEL CHANGES

  It is recommended that Special Agent Supervisor William K. Harvey of the Security Division be transferred to Indianapolis on general assignment.

  J. Edgar ordered a clear humiliation, to emphasize that no one was exempt from Buddha’s wrath.

  Less than a month after the incident, Harvey put in his resignation from the FBI. “Necessary at this time because of personal and family considerations … greatest pride and personal satisfaction … extreme reluctance….Very real appreciation [for the] consideration and kindnesses which you have extended to me…. I would be grateful for the opportunity of seeing you after your return.”

  Hoover replied, equally blandly, on August 13, 1947. “Gratifying to know that your association with the Bureau has been a source of pride and personal satisfaction…. With kindest regards and best wishes …”

  Harvey’s file details what an intense professional he had become by the time he wrapped up his career in the Bureau. His final FBI fitness report shows that he had accumulated ninety-seven days and five hours of unused leave. “A tremendous amount of voluntary overtime work … entitled [Harvey] to the adjective rating of excellent,” wrote Joseph P. Coyne, the special agent whom Harvey had led across Memorial Bridge. The final rating was approved by Mickey Ladd, who added a laconic note: “[Harvey] had an excellent knowledge of Russian espionage and Communist activities.” The special agent in charge of the Los Angeles FBI office recorded, “His grasp of the details of Russian espionage operations in this country was a revelation…. Agents are so enthused…. It is hoped that eventually it will be possible to give [the course on Soviet espionage] to every Special Agent who is investigating Communist and Russian matters.” Harvey’s exit record also shows he had improved as a hip shooter.

  Just two months after the car incident and less than three weeks from his effective date of resignation the Central Intelligence Group (soon to become the Agency) officially told the Bureau that it was hiring Harvey. The Bureau tried without success to find out how much Central Intelligence was going to pay its prize new catch and what he would be doing.

  When Harvey left the Bureau, he was almost thirty-two years old. He had handled the FBI’s hottest espionage cases and was sitting on revelations that would make headlines for years, but Hoover’s snap-brim conformity made Harvey’s decision to jump from national to international espionage operations easy. Peter M. F. Sichel, one of Harvey’s predecessors at the Berlin Operations Base, recalls that Harvey was resentful that the value of his work against the Abwehr’s agents in the United States during World War II had never been recognized and indeed that his efforts on the Bentley case had been largely ignored, even within Hoover’s Bureau.13

  THE MAN WHO BARELY WAS

  In the interesting mind of J. Edgar Hoover, Bill Harvey became an object of scorn, a traitor to the preened and glistening FBI. Hoover continued a periodic campaign to damn Harvey. A Buddha note, dated March 2, 1949, long after Bill’s departure, was part of the continuing, vengeful character assassination campaign. “Why were Supervisors Harvey and [ ] allowed to so mishandle their work? … Harvey was a known procrastinator and he permitted items to accumulate on his desk which probably accounted for the large accumulation of reports…. Harvey was frequently criticized by Mr. Ladd…. In fact, Mr. Ladd advised that he called the attention of the Inspector to this particular type of dereliction on the part of Harvey.”

  W. R. Glavin to Clyde Tolson, March 21, 1949: “This former Agent bears the brunt of the responsibility for the haphazard assignment of the supervision of the [ ] case…. There does not appear to be any excuse for instructions of this [delinquent] kind being issued.” Glavin recommended that “this inadequate supervision be borne in mind in the case any inquiries are received concerning Harvey in the future.”

  From the time of Harvey’s resignation until its close, all references in Bill’s FBI personnel file are negative.

  A VERY PRIVATE PERSON

  Throughout his careers in the FBI and the CIA, Harvey never openly showed the slightest doubt in his own abilities. At the FBI, Bill discovered his great analytical capacity, yet he resolved not to spend his career as a desk jockey. He wanted to run and direct field operations overseas. By 1946, while still in the FBI, his country of choice for special assignment had been Germany. He was prepared to leave Libby (at least temporarily) to get there.

  At the FBI, Harvey established a work pattern that astonished all around him: he appeared to exist on cigarettes and, latterly, martinis. An eighteen-hour day was usual; later, in Berlin, it routinely became twenty. Harvey’s home life took a definite second place. Later, in his second marriage, the equation changed.

  It can easily be assumed that Bill confided next to nothing to Libby. Apart from people with whom he associated professionally, Bill was not a social animal, whereas Libby, as many women who came to Washington, wanted to join one of the district’s social carousels. Libby pined. Her outlet, increasingly, was the bottle.

  CIA TAKES SHAPE

  The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime intelligence-and-executive-action agency, officially shut down in September 1945, when Gen. “Wild Bill” Donovan said farewell to his people in a disused skating rink. An OSS rump survived, concealed as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), under the umbrella of the War Department. “Allen Dulles was God. Dick Helms was chief of ops. Harry Rositzke and Gordon Stewart had set up a headquarters in Wiesbaden,” commented Peter Sichel.14

  In 1947 Alex MacMillan, who had been in the FBI and then gone to OSS, at Wild Bill Donovan’s behest, returned from being OSS/SSU chief of station, Shanghai. “The whole agency in those days was in that red stone building on top of the hill overlooking the brewery, at 2430 E Street, NW…. That was the whole show.”15

  Prodded by Harry S. Truman, Congress that year passed legislation establishing the Central Intelligence Agency. The intelligence-gathering wing of CIA’s Clandestine Services was called the Office of Special Operations (OSO), and it was staffed by fewer than two hundred officers who ran only seven operating bases, all of which were in areas like Germany, Austria, and Japan under American military occupation. The State Department then, and for several years thereafter, was more than reluctant to provide embassy slots for the guttersnipe of the new intelligence department.

  Clarence Berry recalls the physical location of America’s intelligence apparatus during the immediate postwar years: “When I arrived in August 1948, pretty much all of CIA was located in a group of old buildings near the old brewery off Rock Creek Parkway, near Foggy Bottom…. Around 1951, CIA took over all four of the temporaries along the Reflecting Pool, I, J, K, and L.”16

  In 1949 the CIA launched its first operations to parachute agents into the Soviet Union. Only after the outbreak of the Korean War did
OSO’s case officers, mainly those in Berlin and Vienna, begin vigorously to probe the far side of the iron curtain. They also quickly learned from their early efforts that the Soviets were pouring agents into the West.

  With the founding of CIA, Hoover was forced to yield the FBI’s grip on Central and South America, but only with the greatest reluctance. “Under his direct orders … [field] agents burned their files and dismissed their informants, rather than turn [anything] over to the new rival.” But many of Hoover’s cherished Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) agents jumped to the new outfit, gladly. “A number of them, including Eric Timm, Raymond Leddy, Winston MacKinlay Scott, and William King Harvey later occupied key positions in the CIA, while others, such as Robert Maheu, found employment on the covert side.”17

  About fifty special agents left the Bureau for the Agency. Art Thurston, the fellow Hoosier, had switched from the FBI earlier and by 1947 was the CIA’s deputy chief of operations. Dennis Flinn, the other old-time FBI hand who was part of the Harvey triumvirate, says flatly that Art “arranged for a job” for Bill because Harvey was “the most highly trained, most professional man available for CI [counterintelligence] work.” It was almost as if Harvey had designed the scenario that moved him onto the international stage, into a role that he had yearned for all the way back in Kentucky, that had been denied him by the FBI.

  Who actively encouraged Bill to transfer? Alex MacMillan “came back from Shanghai to take over what became our counterintelligence branch. My predecessor was Art Thurston, also a former FBI man, and from Indiana. I heard Bill was coming over….

  “There was a lot of whispering … but no one knew quite what we were going to do. It was difficult to take men who had been involved in domestic operations and switch them to foreign targets. We weren’t thinking about [aggressive] CE [counterespionage] operations against the Sovs abroad then.”18